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# Economic Worlds of Work: Uniting Economic Sociology with the Sociology of work

*Thomas D. Beamish and Nicole Woolsey Biggart*

### 1. Introduction

The economy is the collective production and distribution of resources, that is, the generation and allocation of material goods and services produced by a society in order to sustain it. Work concerns activities that people engage in to support themselves materially and socially within this larger system of production and exchange. To oversimplify, individuals work, and economies are the result. Economies in turn put individuals to work. Given the relationship that exists between work and economy, it is instructive to explore the range of connections that exist between the two and organize them both.

Economic orthodoxy treats work as a commodity, understandable like any other good or service having price or wage fluctuations. This model views market dynamics as organizing the distribution of wages, hence labor, and as inherently separate from other social contexts. Market dynamics are assumed to reflect the aggregate outcome of individual, self-seeking decision-makers, with intact preferences, who calculate and then act to maximize utility. These assumptions, put into practice when the US Federal Reserve, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other policy bodies seek to modify economies, have increasingly become the basis for understanding industrial economies, that is, how labor markets are organized and the costs and quality of labor as an industrial input (cf. Stiglitz 1999). Yet, to view work as just a commodity misses much of what organizes laboring as well as what it represents—its meaning—to those engaged in it.

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Focusing specifically on laboring, sociological studies fill this void by investigating it as both a personal and collective experience under market conditions. Everett Hughes (1958) and the Chicago School focused on professions and professionalism as they manifested in modern industrial contexts. Attention to professional occupations dominated the post-World War II research agenda in this arena; the interest rested in better understanding the potential relationship between one's occupation and personality traits, levels of alienation, job satisfaction, job mobility, and occupational status (Abbott 1993). Studies of work and stratification have also extensively used structural analysis to assess and track demographic movements within industrial economies (Abbott 1993; see Blau and Duncan 1967; Braverman 1974; Simpson 1989; Kohn 1990). For their part, critical labor studies—a locus of Marxist criticism of capitalist modes of production—have analyzed the change from 'archaic systems,' such as feudalism, to 'modern' industrial systems criticizing them for their alienating, exploitive, and destructive consequences on workers and for the loss of control over work and production processes more generally (Burawoy 1979a; Burawoy 1985; Seidman 1991; Vallas 1993). Finally, recent research has focused on trends in work, especially the effect that rapid changes in technology and production are having on workplaces, stressing the changing nature of modern capitalist societies and transformation toward ever more market-based (i.e. commodified) systems of exchange and its reflection in work (Zuboff 1984; Erikson and Vallas 1990; Smith 2001; Vallas 2001).

Economic sociology, in examining the social processes that structure how human societies materially produce, distribute, and consume goods and services,<sup>1</sup> supplies a third view of economic contexts, one that shares a good deal with sociological studies of work, but differs significantly from the suppositions operationalized in economic orthodoxy. Economic sociologists distinguish themselves from their counterparts in economics along three dimensions: (a) economic sociologists do not view economic contexts as separate from social and cultural contexts, but rather view them as reflective of and embedded within such contexts; (b) economic sociologists view actor preferences and individual actions as less intact, calculated, and about maximizing utility than they are as more ambiguous and affected by socially derived cognitive strategies, substantive rationality, feelings, roles, norms, myths, and expectations that form the basis for interpretation itself and thus even economic decision-making; (c) and finally, economic sociologists reject methodological individualism—the idea that the aggregation of individual-level behavior is unproblematic—

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in favor of models that suggest collections of persons create dynamics different from that which an aggregation of individuals would suggest (see Guillen et al. 2002: 5).

As is obvious, economic sociologists and scholars of work are uniquely positioned to question the assumptions that pervade classical and contemporary accounts of economy and labor and that leaves much of what characterizes exchange and work assumed and unseen. As economic sociologists, we contend that explicit attention to the overlap between the study of economies and work settings, like the actual nexus of economies and work, provides an avenue for a deeper understanding of both.

The quintessential scholar of work and economy, Karl Marx, was the first to theorize explicitly industrial labor relations, noting that price was an inherently distorted means of assessing and understanding the value of work. At the very heart of Marx's 'labor theory of value' (Marx 1967) was his notion that changing economic structures transformed social relations and that the laboring of humans also reflected changing legal, political, and ideological conditions (Marx and McLellan 1977). Yet, in all of his brilliance, even Marx did not predict the numerous forms capitalism would take as it has expanded and both absorbed varied systems of production, exchange, and work, and been transformed in the process. As we know from empirical investigations, capitalist markets, as Marx predicted, have not extinguished all other forms of work and exchange. Rather, capitalism's very expansion has pushed its expression in many different directions and away from a single monolithic shape.

On this front, over the last twenty years, economic sociologists have found that the multiplicity of 'capitalisms' reflects divergent historical contingencies (Collins 1980; Wallerstein 1984; Hamilton 1994), social structures (Granovetter 1985; Baker 1990; Burt 1992; Granovetter 1992; Podolny 1994; Romo and Schwartz 1995; Uzzi 1996; Uzzi 1997; Uzzi 1999) and sociopolitical and cultural milieus (Campbell and Lindberg 1991; Fligstein 1996*a*; Fligstein 1996*b*). Such varieties of capitalism studies by economic sociologists have demonstrated that capitalist societies can be built upon a broad array of organizational and occupational arrangements, yet be resolutely committed to private investment, profit-seeking, free labor, price competition, and other factors we associate with developed capitalist, market based, or enterprise economies. We know, too, that labor regimes differ depending on the role and structure of states (Burawoy 1979*b*; Campbell and Lindberg 1990; Dobbin 1994; Biggart and Guillén 1999; Dobbin and Dowd 2000), experience with labor organization (Hicks et al. 1978; Cornfield 1991; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1991), and

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sometimes with the historical experience of colonialism (Fields 1995). For the most part, however, these studies do not examine directly the structure of exchange and how it shapes work relations—economic connections between laborers, ideologies of work, forms of remuneration, and the meaning of work to those who labor.

Taking the ‘lessons learned’ from the literatures in economic sociology, in this chapter we explore the idea that different structures of exchange affect labor’s conceptualization and organization. We utilize research by economic sociologists and related scholarship to illustrate this point. Research by economic sociologists has, in interrogating how economic activity is arranged and understood, provided tools in understanding the context within which work is conceptualized, conducted, organized, and remunerated. In the following pages we:

- Briefly discuss the dominant paradigms that characterize contemporary analysis of economic contexts: economic utility models, conflict models, social structure models, and institutional-cultural models.
- Briefly present a typology of exchange systems that identifies four ideal typifications, reflective of the nexus of exchange and work that emerges from the empirical research and theory by economic sociologists and associated scholars. The typology both opens-up markets to more critical sociological analysis and extends analysis of economic contexts beyond an exclusive focus on modern markets. Both tacks offer insights relevant to studies of work.
- Reflecting the sociological research and theory of economy and organized by the typology we have found emerges from this research, we review the empirical contributions that economic sociology offers for understanding economies and the implications these hold for understanding work: how it is arranged, performed, changed, and understood by those who are involved in it.
- Finally, we suggest how sensitivity to variations in the way exchange is organized—both within and outside of markets—provides a promising basis for mutually theorizing economic and work studies.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. Theories of the Economic in Relation to Work

Economic sociologists have made a key distinction that differentiates their approach to economic contexts, broadly defined, from those pursued by classical economics. It centers on exploding the notion of ‘exchange’ to

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accommodate social relations, social institutions, and social structures in a way entirely denied by the later group of scholarship (Lie 1992). Exchange as conceived by Max Weber is a 'voluntary agreement involving the offer of any sort of present, continuing, or future utility in exchange for utilities of any sort offered in return' (Weber 1978). It can involve money, goods, and/or services but can also reflect less tangible elements like respect, reciprocity, obligation, duty, and even moral convictions (Polanyi 1957*a*; 1957*b*). Exchange is one of four basic economic activities, the others being saving, consumption, and production (e.g. laboring) that in practice are typically combined and approached under the overarching term 'market(s)'. Each form of economic action may be subject to organizing, rationalization, and institutionalization and, as we review later, has ramifications for understanding the forms that work takes (Weber 1976). We utilize the more inclusive 'exchange systems' when referring to truck and barter scenarios, as opposed to the usual but specific term market(s). When we do use the term market, we refer only to those economic conditions assumed by classical economics, or to empirical settings that approximate those conditions (much later).

In general, the study of economic contexts in the social sciences has taken five primary forms: neoclassical economic/microeconomic (hereafter neoclassical economic), conflict, network, ecological, and institutional-cultural models. While these distinctions, when sharply drawn, are routinely violated in research practice, they do provide a useful basis for theoretical comparison (for examples of economic analyses that cross these tidy boundaries see North 1981; Akerlof 1984; Coleman 1990). Neoclassical economic theories provide the intellectual bases for contemporary political institutions, social policy, and economic analysis (see Chapter 7,). In this perspective, exchange uncorrupted by social influences would appear as a perfect market. A perfect market reflects autonomous or free participants who gauge and strategize their actions based entirely on an assessment of the benefit-to-cost ratio of any given product or service they seek to acquire or trade (Eatwell et al. 1987). Price and its fluctuation is the central mechanism around which the individual makes decisions. Price reflects supply and demand; the differences in offers to buy and sell provoke changes in supply, which in turn theoretically lowers demand and hence price (and vice versa). Finally, in calculating price, economists also assume that the free individual seeks maximum return in any given exchange. Thus conceived, price as a reflection of marginal utility<sup>3</sup> is the mechanism through which order or market equilibrium—Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' (1776)—is achieved and maintained

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over time. As summarized by Gary Becker, one of the most prolific advocates for a neoclassical model, 'all human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility from stable sets of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets' (Becker 1976). While economists recognize that markets are socially real places, with real actors, it is against the presumption of the perfect market that they compare all exchange relations (Becker and Murphy 2000).

Despite the broad scope, consistency, and parsimony of neoclassical economic theory, as well as its widespread policy application to both global and domestic economies—including labor markets—this approach does not provide a realistic analysis of the contexts and conditions under which actual exchange and work take place (Lie 1992; Lie 1997). That is, the gulf between the theoretical presumptions economists employ, and the empirical markets they seek to explain, remains wide. According to economic sociologists, this is at least in part because of the model's failure to take seriously social relations as reflected in affiliations, culture, and institutions and to adequately address inequality and conflict in market contexts (see Reskin and Roos 1990).

Sociologists who study exchange and emphasize conflict—often but not only from the Marxist tradition—focus on the extent to which firms or 'producers' control labor processes and thus set the terms and conditions for work (Burawoy 1979*b*; Burawoy 1985). Marxists assume that the mode of production that dominates any given society or epoch (currently capitalism), embodies its own logic whose basis is found in various forms of labor exploitation (see Chapter 2). Scholarship of this kind has historicized past and present labor arrangements, noting the conditions under which capitalism, capitalist states, and capitalist firms have exerted their control over labor (Block 1996; Tilly and Tilly 1998) and promoted inequality (Moore 1987) as well as the effect ideology has had on laboring within capitalist systems (Thompson 1964). Sociology of race and feminist scholarship views production as not only bisected by a capitalist/manager-worker dimension. Conflict theorists see sex and gender, race and ethnicity, and economic development as premised on sex/gender and race/ethnic exploitation (Boserup 1970; Enloe 1990; Cheng and Hsuing 1992; Escobar 1995 [also, see Chapter 5]).

Sociologists who study networks also complicate the assumptions of neoclassical economics, viewing markets as historically developed social structures constituted by concrete social relations—networks of social ties—not merely an aggregation of rational individuals (White 1981;

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Burt 1982; Baker 1984; Granovetter 1985; Burt 1992; Baker et al. 1998). Network analysts emphasize an anticategorical imperative, in which the attributes of actors (race, class, and gender) are rejected in favor of their roles, positions, and the strength of the ties between them. More than a collection of individuals, according to network analysts, markets reflect the roles, positions, and relationality of participants. Network analysts contend that markets must be understood as independent of specific actor will, belief, and values (Wellman 1983). Network studies of markets as reflecting embedded social ties by Granovetter (1985), Uzzi (1996, 1997, 1999) and others (e.g. Baker 1990; Burt 1992; Granovetter 1992; Romo and Schwartz 1995) have substantially increased our understanding of exchange as influenced by the structural embeddedness of networked individuals.

Sociologists who pursue an ecological view of markets (Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan 1983; Hannan and Freeman 1984; Barnett and Carroll 1995; Hannan et al. 1995; Barnett and Rivers 1998; Aldrich 1999) take a macroorganizational/firm view that tracks birth and death rates based on competitive-selection processes (see Chapter 11). In some respects, they share a good deal with network theorists in their tracking of the structure of commercial markets and industries, but their unit of analysis, their focus on competition, and attention to the environment as the driving force behind change is sharply divergent from network theories emphasis and foci. Ecologists view competitive environmental pressure on organizational populations as providing selection pressures in which the 'fit' (i.e. adapted) survive and the unfit disappear from the market. In this conceptualization, strategy and effort have a limited impact; it is the environment, not actors that determine competitive outcomes. Obviously sociality in the form of culture, politics, and relationality have little play in this theoretical perspective (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976). Ecological models have sensitized economic sociologists to large-scale trends that transform the shape markets take, the shape of firms within markets take, and how diffusion of these forms proceeds. The changes that the ecological view documents have obvious overlap for understanding and predicting the shape work will take in any given 'field' or market where organizational activity takes place.

A fifth approach to understanding exchange and economies, an institutional-cultural view (Zelizer 1988, 1994; Abolafia 1996; Fligstein 2001; Biggart and Delbridge 2004), also shows the importance of social structures in market settings, but emphasizes substantive relations largely ignored by ecological and network theorists (conflict theorists often



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share this attention to culture and ideology as well). The institutional-cultural view assumes ties must be collectively meaningful (Beamish, forthcoming), noting how differing cultures are associated with, and predict, differing exchange relations and hence distinct market logics (Biggart and Hamilton 1992; Biggart and Guillén 1999). Furthermore, from the institutional-cultural perspective, rationality is understood as constrained by conventions, belief, and existing social relations (Biggart and Beamish 2003), and operates on a more limited scale than assumed by economic models. For example, Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) identify three ways that cultural institutions affect economic behavior, and by extension, the forms that work takes: (a) by influencing how actors define their own interests, which they call constitutive effects; (b) by constraining the behavior of exchangers through self-regulation, or regulatory effects; (c) by shaping the capacity of groups and individuals to mobilize through the shaping of goals and aspirations conceptually available for enactment.

**Table 9.1.** Theories of markets

Theories of Exchange	Logics	Foci
Economic model	Asocial forces that posits exchange to reflect autonomous individuals, with stable preferences, optimizing behavior, with price as organizer	Asocial-individualistic, dynamic, strategic-competitive
Critical model	'Producers' and/or the 'Powerful' control exchange processes and set the terms and conditions for the exploitation of labor	Social-structural, dynamic, power-determined
Structural model	Social structures that provide parameters on and thus determine exchange behaviors	Social-structural, static, normative-relational
Ecological model	Reflecting competition for scarce resources, environmental conditions select the most 'fit'	Social-structural, dynamic, competitive-environmental
Institutional-cultural model	Social forces that reflect power, ideology, and socially constructed frameworks that define and direct exchange behaviors	Social-structural, dynamic, interpretive-interactional-relational

### 3. Exchange and Labor: Contribution of Economic Sociology to Understanding Work

While the assumptions of these paradigms studying markets and exchange vary, each identifies constituent elements of systems of exchange that have important implications for understanding the shape work takes and why. The typical economic approach focuses our attention on the rationality of individuals buying and selling labor in a marketplace. The conflict approach illustrates how inequality is systematically reproduced in labor markets and laboring more generally. The social structural approach of network theorists asks us to understand work and labor markets as linked social spheres that influence who gets jobs, promotions, and occupational status. Also structural, the ecological view focuses attention on the larger environment which exerts pressures and pushes selection processes; some firms, sets of firms, populations of firms, and fields of firms survive and prosper passing on traits (strategies, configurations, relations) while others do not survive and thus disappear. Obviously, the shape a firm or population of competing firms takes (i.e. an industry) and whether or not this shape survives to diffuse has a good deal of bearing on work as it has much to do with the forms industrial enterprise takes and thus work within them. Lastly, the institutional-cultural approach reminds us to examine the meaning of work for those working as well as for those who employ workers and how the meaning of exchange and work itself reflects different social settings and different institutional parameters.

These views, collectively, also illustrate how truly intertwined work and economy are—that prevailing systems of work and exchange relations mirror one another. For instance, in Anglo-influenced societies there is an ideological emphasis on exchange governed by utilitarian reasoning, efficiency, and economically calculated relations. These exchange logics are reflected in how the ‘typical worker’ in many western industrial economies views his or her labor participation and forms expectations concerning remuneration and obligation to fellow workers and employers. Yet, even as marketized notions of doing business spread, they continue to be founded on, built out of, and imbricated with yet other social systems of meaning and relationality, are inherently context dependant, and require a certain amount of ‘switching’ as sets of rules that apply to one work space, for example, a factory, are deemed inappropriate to another, for example a household (see Mische and White 1998). In short, the approaches to economy that we have described make varied assumptions and observations about what organizes labor and economic relations, and

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we would suggest that all are right. None, however, can make a successful claim to universal correctness.

In this, however, economic sociological arguments do collectively diverge from their classical economic contemporaries in the place they give social relations and substantive rationality in economic contexts. That is, all the economic sociological arguments unite around the view that exchange involves more than just the exercise in formal-rational and calculative behavior, but also reflects substantive relations that differently organize exchange relations. Yet, they also diverge from one another in their research attentions and from their divergent research attentions have emerged observations and corresponding theories that illuminate the diverse basis for human economy. Specifically, a handful of relatively stable systems of exchange have been identified by economic sociologists that cohere over time and across space and that shed light on how work itself is arranged and why. These systems of exchange likewise reveal parallel systems of work and participation that reflect distinctive 'life worlds' (Habermas 1975). Thus, by combining the observations made by economic, conflict, network, ecological, and cultural-institutional approaches to economic organization, we can address more effectively the relationship that work has to exchange and economy.

With this in mind, we offer four ideal-type modes of exchange which have emerged from the empirical record and that have been found to differently organize human economy and, our contention in this chapter, the shape of work both within modern markets and in nonmarket contexts. While these logics can help distinguish *between* dominant systems of exchange, each is also simultaneously at play *within* any given economic system. These are analytic dimensions; concrete social settings involving exchange always involve more than one of these even if one exchange-logic is dominant. The systems of exchange are *market systems*, *associative systems*, *communal systems*, and *moral systems* (see Table 9.2). Modern markets, as conventionally conceived by classical economics and many studies by sociologists of economy and work, are but one 'ideal-typical' form of exchange, and even markets are inherently social-structural, cultural, and simultaneously riven by conflict and inequity. The typology identifies qualitatively different systems of exchange that vary along continuums of *instrumental—substantive* or value-based action and how strongly *universal—particularistic* relations, which represent the social context of participant decision-making. Each case represents a logic to decision-making and action that distinguishes it from the other action logics. Our typology is a model that, like all models, should be judged on its

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**Table 9.2.** Economic organization and meaning in worlds of work

<i>Processes</i>	Market	<i>Systems</i> Associative	Communal	Moral
Alignment	Instrumental-Universalistic	Instrumental-Particularistic	Substantive-Particularistic	Substantive-Universalistic
Meaning	'You pay and I'll work'.	'I'll work for your benefit, if you'll work for my benefit'.	'I work out of obligation to the group'.	'I work for a higher purpose'.
Remuneration	Wages	Payment	Privilege	Honor
Structure	Market	Network	Collective	Substantive
Differentiation	Individualistic	Relational	In/out group	Ethical
Relation	Contractual	Extended Partnership	Obligatory	Normative
Exit	Final	Breach	Elder status	None

ability as a heuristic device to aid in understanding empirical contexts, not on its 'truth value'.<sup>6</sup>

In brief, in the following pages we outline the contribution economic sociology has made in better understanding exchange in a multitude of settings, both market and nonmarket, and what this suggests about its relationship to the arrangement of work. We organize our efforts by employing the four column systems of exchange typology. In this, we first examine and emphasize research by economic sociologists on contemporary markets as immanently social contexts, revealing their quickly changing shape, and document the widespread effect this is having on work relations in the developed and less developed world. Second, we review economic sociological research on alternative (i.e. nonmarket based) systems of exchange—represented in *associative*, *communal*, and *moral* precepts in Table 9.2—that reflect very different understandings of work and hence the action logics that arrange that work differently. We note at the outset that while markets are indeed expanding in their influence the world over, they are by no means unaffected or entirely extinguishing other forms of exchange.

### *The Market System and Commodified Labor*

Column one elaborates market systems, price-driven exchange arenas that most closely approximate the free-market ideal assumed by traditional economics. That is, for economists any given market is either more or

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less perfect depending on how closely it resembles or diverges from a set of prescriptive assumptions, including: (a) a sufficiently large number of firms/individuals so that no single firm/individual makes more than a negligible contribution to output; (b) homogenous goods and services that any single consumer/exchanger would not prefer over any another seller/exchangers; (c) socially isolated and independent exchangers; (d) exchangers with complete information on which to make decisions regarding their prospective exchange (see Stigler 1968). The ideal typical marketplace operates on universalistic criteria as participants seek to maximize their gains irrespective of the persons with whom they exchange. While economists recognize that no real market conforms to their hypothesized ideal, they do hold that this conceptualization is a useful fiction against which to contrast the functioning of any given real market, tagging deviations as 'imperfections' in need of remedy and movement toward the ideal.

Sociological accounts of markets are typically critical of traditional economic assumptions—that is, methodological individualism, instrumental behavior, and universalistic ideals as explaining behavior in modern markets. However, while they do complicate these assumptions, economic sociologists do not dismiss them entirely, finding that what distinguishes modern markets is their general adherence to many of the precepts economists have identified. Rather, economic sociologists understand that features such as rationality and self-interest are variable across time and space and thus a product of social and cultural construction, not intrinsically universal human conditions (Polanyi 1957a; Lie 1992). For example, in Abolafia's participant observation and comparative analysis of three Wall Street institutions (1996)—stock, bond, and futures markets<sup>4</sup>—he argues that the structure of each local exchange supports a particular type of culture (i.e. reflective of substantive forms of rationality) that leads to a distinct orientation toward economic action that includes, for example, utility maximizing behavior, but is not limited to it. He identifies culturally constructed and self-imposed restrictions that mitigate the destabilizing and destructive aspects of pure short-term self-interest. Such collectively constructed yet self-imposed social constraints help to stabilize market interactions and in so doing benefit individuals and the larger collective over the long term. Thus, Abolafia's ethnography does not discount the role that instrumental behavior plays in the work of floor traders or the universalistic ideals these workers espouse when speaking of their behavior on the trading floor, but modifies them by acknowledging their place in an inherently social and relational context. Similarly,

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Charles Smith (1989) in studying auctions suggests how different types of auction markets lead to different, socially derived, price setting behaviors by antique dealers, horse traders, and others whose work involves buying and selling commodities on an exchange. Thus, while participants on trading floors and auctions continue to evince overwhelmingly instrumental behavioral patterns and pay homage to largely universalistic (i.e. fair) trading and interaction criteria—at least rhetorically—these and other studies like them reveal that there is more at work than just formal, rational, and universal criteria in market settings.

At the level of the firm, industry, and nation-state economic sociologists have also become increasingly aware of differences in how industrial organization and employment relations manifest across national and even regional boundaries even in what are identified as market economies. For example, Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre (1986: 122) compare German and French industrial systems, noting that neoclassical theories of labor markets cannot explain the differences between these countries. Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre's research conclusions deny a basic assumption of classical economic doctrine captured in what is called 'convergence theory'—that all market-industrial systems will eventually converge as they excise 'anachronistic' and 'primitive' forms and relations and move toward a single, modern, and advanced market-industrial system (cf. Kaufman et al. 1988; Rostow 1990). In comparing the two industrial systems, Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre found that social institutional differences by nation in the educational, commercial, and employment relations domains determine how work, society, and markets are constructed, intertwined, and why they differ. Thus, while both Germany and France exhibit modern industrial economies and mature market features, they differ based in their distinct social and institutional bases that further reflect distinct social and cultural histories.

Similarly, the importance of social institutions such as those reflected in associative based systems of exchange (see Table 9.2, column 2) and work are evident in Asian economies. For example, Gerlach's study of Japanese business groups, *Alliance Capitalism* (1992), and Redding's work on Chinese capitalism (1990) both exemplify the nexus of markets and association-based social ties in the conduct of business and the structure of employment relations. In these and parallel research investigations, associative systems—networks of strong and weak ties (Granovetter 1973)—reflect mutual dependence and reciprocity amongst market participants and exist at the level of the individual (Uzzi 1999), firm (Child and Faulkner 1998) and industry (Hirsch 1985). Examples of 'networked

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firms' include Japanese keiretsu, Korean chaebol as well as Anglo-American franchises and industry giants such as petrochemical (Yeargin 1991; King and Lennox 2000) and music/entertainment industries (Hirsch 1972; Dowd 2002).<sup>5</sup> In fact, these and other analyses of East Asian, European, and American capitalist exchange systems suggest the limits of economic theory's individualized actor assumptions to conceptualize how particularistic economic relations, in both associative and communal forms, play a part in organizing market economies and work.

The interpenetration of firms, work within firms, markets, and network ties of the communal type (see Table 9.2, column 3) are also born out in Kondo's ethnography (1990) and Dore's case-comparative research (1973) on work, exchange, and economy in Japan and Britain. Dore compared the British industrial system to Japan's in a search for what distinguishes Japan from western industrial employment systems. Dore, like Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre (1986), eschewed established explanations of markets such as economic convergence finding that Japan's unique form of employment relations—lifetime employment, intrafirm labor markets with intrafirm career system, intrafirm training, intrafirm based unions, intrafirm based welfare, benefits, and collectivist ideology—was itself spreading to more pronounced and 'classical' market economies such as Britain's. Japan's employment relations, according to Dore, reflect a unique blend of paternalism and more universalistic criteria typically associated with advanced market systems. Dore, in drawing these distinctions, labels the Japanese system 'welfare corporatism' and distinguishes this 'organizationally oriented' system from the 'market oriented' one prevalent in Britain (p. 278). 'Organizationally oriented' captures aspects of a traditional communal system that predates the emergence of industrial markets in Japan and those of the market system ideal prevalent in the West. Dore, however, does not view communal qualities as destined to disappearance as market ideals penetrate deeper into Japanese society. Rather, he surmises that communal ethics fortify Japanese style industrialism and, because of their success (at that time), have a chance to influence Britain's and other European economies.

Kondo (1990) too, in an ethnography of a family owned confectionery in Tokyo that employed thirty full-time and eight-half time workers, provides a picture that illustrates the overlap of cultural idioms of paternalism that interpenetrate with more formal-rational market-based ideals. Kondo, in a revealing example, explores the employer's use of Japan's cultural idiom of 'kinspeople' in addressing his employees as if they were family and also through his sponsorship of group activities while he

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simultaneously pursued a very shrewd individualistic agenda reflected in his use of management consultants to expand his business and in employing surveillance cameras to assure employee follow through. Ironically, the employees used the 'company as family' idiom to their own advantage when seeking worker empowerment in that factory setting.

Likewise, research on women in national as well as international and global markets has led critical scholars to argue that capitalist industry has systematically exploited female labor—free labor in domestic contexts and low-wage labor in the commercial sector—in ways that distinguishes women's experience (i.e. particularism) from that of men of equivalent race, ethnic, and class backgrounds. For example, in the European context, while Rubery, Smith, Fagan (1999) find women's increased labor participation since the 1980s as a striking change in European labor markets, equally conspicuous is the continuing inequality experienced by women in market-based workplaces. These reflect deeply seated social and cultural norms (aka, patriarchy) that coexist with the 'market ideal' that ostensibly emphasizes instrumental and universalistic criteria instead of the particularism inherent to gender discrimination (Scott 1994; see also U.S. parallels Ridgeway 1997; Milkman 1987; Treiman and Roos 1983).

Similarly, research by critical scholars on global economic development has made a strong case that the exploitation of women's labor has, in part, laid the basis for both the industrialization of the west (Engels 1902; Kessler-Harris and Levenson 1982; Matthaei 1982) and the more recent expansion of markets into parts of the developing world (Boserup 1970; Enloe 1990; Cheng and Hsuing 1992; Escobar 1995). Feminist scholars point to Asian Export Processing Zones, Mexican Maquiladoras (Brecher and Costello 1994; Parrado and Zenteno 2001), South and Central American agriculture production (Faber 1993), as well as global sex-tourism (Enloe 1990) to illustrate the gender exploitive exchange relations that arrange the work of women and that characterize the current international division of labor. Theoretical explanations such as *Human Capital* (Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos 1993), *Household Strategy* (Gonzalez del la Rocha 1994), and the *New International Division of Labor* (Nash and Fernandez-Kelly 1983) argue for the important role communal relations, specifically patriarchal family structures play in defining roles, rules, and remuneration and hence in organizing work relations even in ostensibly market driven contexts. Communal ties reflect culturally inscribed gender norms, obligations, constraints, and inducements for women and men that critical sociologists have found provide the substantive basis for lower pay and less power in workplaces for female laborers.



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Finally, a handful of authors have also shown the place that morality can play in market places where participants ideally make decisions by calculating costs-to-benefit seemingly devoid of deep substantive convictions. Although economic theory assumes that individuals rationally calculate and in so doing seek to maximize their benefit when making exchange decisions, the concept of benefit typically is left unexplored in the category of 'utility'. Empirical research by economic sociologists shows that actors use moral filters to make choices in some market settings—choices that influence who they will trade with, how they will transact, and even what is considered valuable. Opening up the category of benefit, utility and even cost reveals the role that substantive, moral categories have on exchange relations. For example, in Biggart's research (1989) on direct selling organizations in the USA, she shows how market behavior involves calculation, but the calculations of Biggart's direct selling informants is infused with meanings that are substantively based and attain a quasi-religious status among direct selling salespersons. Likewise, Charles Smith's work on auctions (already covered above) also reveals that considerations of community and appropriateness shape the actual bidding process and the prices paid by patrons.

These studies and others like them that we outline later, show both the distinctive features of exchange and work in market-based systems that sets them off—especially greater adherence to instrumental and universalistic ideals—even while noting the reality of people who rely on substantive relations and whose relations to one another can reflect systematic inequalities and work relations. We contend that analysis would miss these considerations if it did not challenge traditional economic assumptions concerning the basis of markets.

### *Changing Markets*

As an ideal typical form, contemporary markets, the world over, are also in a state of rapid transition and transformation (Dicken 1992; Evans 1995; Castells 1996; Dicken 2003; Guillén 2001). Changes to domestic and global markets have broad implications for current and future forms of work. For example, trends in the deregulation of markets and the opening of formerly closed, isolated, and undeveloped markets to outside producers and consumers have resulted in new price and cost pressures. These have translated into increased production speeds, faster product innovation cycles, as well as increases in the variety of products and services that are offered globally (Henderson and Castells 1987).

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In the main, economic sociologists have identified three interrelated trends in market transformation significant to the study of work. These are: (a) the overall expansion and changing shape of markets, (b) the changing nature and flow of capital in markets, and (c) the dynamic role of deregulation and technological innovation in both fomenting and reflecting these trends and in changing the form and content of work. These shifts, extensively documented by economic sociologists, are dramatically rearranging the relationships that characterize markets: relations between capital, management, and labor, and the character of work itself.

### *The Changing Shape of Markets*

The expansion and changing form of markets takes shape in both the internationalization or geographic spread of economic activity across national borders and in globalization, which involves the increased functional integration of what had previously been, dispersed economic activity (Reich 1991; Dicken 1992; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Evans 1995; Castells 1996; Dicken 2003). Trends in globalization, especially those that have internationalized price competition, have had direct impact on work through the simultaneous lowering of wage structures in some parts of the world and increasing the availability of low wage-work in others (Sassen 1988; Appelbaum and Henderson 1992; Evans 1995). Globalization and associated trends in manufacturing have also led to capital flight both within and between nations toward cheaper locations (Strange 1996). Lower costs come from less expensive material resource inputs, lower taxes and reduced regulatory intervention, and decreased labor costs (Faber 1993). The internationalization of the search for lower cost structures has exerted parallel pressure to innovate and further reduce production process costs, increase competitiveness, and secure survival niches (Fligstein 2001). In short, each of the elements pushing for increased internationalization and global economic integration has dynamically accelerated the rate with which the whole process of economic expansion is occurring (Castells 1996). In this increasingly competitive economic environment, work has been dramatically restructured. For example, certain job categories such as blue collar unskilled and semi-skilled manufacturing work has virtually disappeared from the developed world's workforce as it is mechanized out of existence (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Zuboff 1984) or moves offshore where cheaper nonunion labor is plentiful (Brecher and Costello 1994).

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### *The Changing Nature and Flow of Capital in Markets*

Perhaps the strongest force behind these changes to the global economy and work derives from changes in capital markets themselves, reflected in: (a) how capital projects are financed and (b) the expectations that these various forms of financing hold for their capital endeavors. There is a direct link between availability and access to capital, the shapes firms have taken, and hence the nature of work in those firms (Chandler 1977; Berk 1994). Economic sociologists and economic historians who have followed the rise of large integrated corporations have found them to reflect nineteenth-century access to tremendous sums of accumulated capital that in turn mirrors the dominant role finance has played in the rise of US style capitalism (Roy 1997; Perrow 2002). Other trends related to the rise of financier driven capitalism include the increased control shareholders and boards of directors have over chief executive officers (Useem 1984; Useem 1993) the volatility of international capital flows (Useem 1996) and the rise of downsizing as a strategy used by executives to provide surges in stock value (Ayling 1997; Naylor and Willimon 1997; Crenson and Ginsberg 2002; Baumol et al. 2003).

Economic sociologists of both the intuitionist and ecological schools have documented transformations in how corporations are organized and the priorities they pursue reflective of changing economic environments (Zeitlin 1974; Herman 1981; Mizruchi 1982; Schwartz and Mizruchi 1987; Fligstein 1990; Boeker 1991; Hannan 1995; Swaminathan and Carroll 1995; Dobbin and Dowd 1997; Swaminathan and Carroll 2000). Shifts in control of large modern corporations have also been studied extensively by sociologists of the economy and are important to an understanding of work, both as it is experienced and understood. For example, changes in control of America's largest corporations impacts labor, in both its form and influence, in firm planning, work remuneration, and organization structure.

Studies show that over time, corporate strategy has reflected different conceptions of the firm, the changing terms on which competition takes place, and differing firm 'birth' conditions (Leblebici et al. 1991; Abolafia and Biggart 1991; Baron, Hannan, and Burton 1999). Beginning with the industrial revolution through the 1940s, industrial firms were run by owners and then engineer-managers and primarily understood by them as in the business of producing commodities (see Shenhav 1999). Yet, by the close of World War II, as firms increasingly confronted a consumer market premised on replacement, not first time purchase of commodities,

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sales and marketing specialists began to emerge and hold sway in US corporations. This changed firm strategy away from purely production-based concerns to one that emphasized sales, marketing, and market strategy—what kind and how commodities were produced. This model gave way in the late 1970s as managers and executives with backgrounds in finance, in turn, rose to prominence. These managers brought with them a finance conception of the corporation that viewed them as a bundle of assets (Fligstein 1987; Palmer et al. 1993; Palmer et al. 1995). Finally, recent changes in financial markets have promoted a permutation on this finance conception of the firm toward ever-tighter linkages between shareholder interests, firm performance, and executive decision-making that has had far reaching implications for firms, workers, and the economy more generally. This latest finance-based shareholder conception of the firm views firms, not only as a set of assets but as little more than a balance sheet whose basic function is to provide immediate returns (i.e. dividends) to shareholders and where ‘assets on balance sheets that (are) underperforming (are) to be sold off, and the profits either dispersed among shareholders or reinvested where higher rates of return might appear’ (Fligstein 2001).

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This emphasis on finance and shareholder value has de-emphasized the largely unassailable place of formerly dominant key actors: owners, managers, and banks. With the move away from a conception of the corporation as exclusively a commodity-producing entity, coupled with the internationalization of production, the concerns of labor have also become less salient to firm strategizing and decision-making (Kolko 1988; Reich 1991; Brecher and Costello 1994; Castells 1996). The finance conception of the firm also directly impacted work by supporting corporate mergers, divestitures, large debt loads, the buying and selling of company stock by corporate pension funds, closing profitable plants for their sale as capital assets, union busting, laying off workers, downsizing, and even strategically employing chapter 11 bankruptcy to ‘discipline labor’ even when profits were high (Delaney 1992).

Downsizing has been the most contentious cost-reduction tactic widely experienced by the US workforce (Koeber 2002; Knudsen et al. 2003). Initially, in the 1980s, downsizing was publicly rationalized by US corporate managers as a means of reducing redundancy, decreasing costs, and increasing efficiency in production processes (Littler and Innes 2003). Yet, research by economic sociologists over the past two decades has revealed that downsizing better reflects a preemptive financial strategy large corporations have used to increase their stock values (Naylor and Willimon

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1997). That is, evidence suggests that downsizing generally does not produce favorable long-term results in efficiency, lower costs, or increases in production that it was initially held to promote, but rather induces a positive but temporary rise in stock prices (Budros 2002). Finally, while the pressures contemporary firms confront have been well researched by economic sociologists, their direct impact on the arrangement, forms, pace, and meaning of work has not been equally well considered and require continued vigorous investigation (see Smith 2001).

### *The Changing Shape of Technologies and the Expansion of Market Time and Market Space*

Both pushing and reflecting these market changes are corollary trends in deregulation and technological innovation. According to economic sociologists, the deregulation of key industries such as communications, transportation, financial services, utilities, and telecommunications mirror the internationalization of capital as outside investors seek access to local and regional markets (Guillen 2001; Gereffi et al. 2002). Capital expansion, deregulation, functional integration of the global economy and technological innovation accompany and accelerate the expansion of market systems as described earlier. Innovation in information and communications technologies, biotechnologies, new materials, energy, and space technologies (Freeman 1987 as quoted in Dicken 1992: 469) have decentered some industries, such as textiles and apparel and electronic manufacture (Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000; Gereffi et al. 2002) and pushed yet others, such as financial services, banking, consulting, and other specialized services, to agglomerate (Storper and Walker 1989; Sassen 1993; Sassen 2001).

These trends have in turn quickened already manifest globalizing tendencies. New, often smaller-scale, competitive ventures characterized by lower cost structures and the latest production technologies do not have the same immobility and sunk costs in outdated technologies and the high wages associated with the more established mass producers. Since the late 1970s mass or 'Fordist' producers—where unionized narrowly skilled workers toil on complex yet rigid single-purpose machinery using standardized inputs to create standardized outputs—have been severely challenged by contemporary flexible and lean production strategies (Shai-ken 1993). For example, the steel industry—a former bulwark of US industrial strength and mass productive apparatus—is now dominated by small steel mills known as minimills that rely on highly flexible methods of

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production characterized by modular and modifiable machinery with fewer multiskilled workers accustomed to multitasking (Henderson and Clark 1990; Utterback 1994; Prechel 1997). This trend in the size and shape the industry takes is also observable in cement, glass, and microcomputer industries as well (Anderson and Tushman 1990). Finally, even symbol analysts (Reich 1997)—the skilled high-end workers touted as the basis for the developed world's continued affluence and technical dominance—are seeing the migration of jobs and the kinds of work associated with them. Programmers, designers, and other technical-specialist positions, particularly in capital and technology-intensive sectors such as heavy machinery, petrochemicals, computers, and automobiles are beginning to exit developed economies. Countries such as India, Sri Lanka, South Korea, and Taiwan, which have highly educated populations and gain advantage from low-wage structures, are increasingly picking up such jobs (Gereffi, et al. 1990; Haggard 1990; Gereffi and Fonda 1992).

Economic sociology, then, while not focusing explicitly on working conditions per se does expose the logic behind firm behavior and consequences for market structuring, which helps illuminate how and why work conditions appear as they do. Economic sociologists have also shown the important part that environment and competition, associations and networks, culture and institutions, and power and inequality play in shaping the market context of work. These accounts have helped us understand the economic contexts within which work is organized and performed (see also Chapter 11). While there is no consensus in economic sociology on the shape or directions contemporary markets will take, there is implicit agreement that firm, industry, and market structures will continue to change dramatically in the near and long-term and with them the nature of laboring in economies globally.

### *Nonmarket Systems of Exchange: Associational, Communal, and Moral*

Economic sociologists provide a much more complicated picture of exchange relations than the theoretical ideal posited by classical economics and operationalized under methodological individualism. As empirical accounts by economic sociologists have repeatedly shown, this holds true even for market contexts where the ideal holds considerable resonance in explaining human behavior and economic transactions, but does not explain all or even most of what occurs in any given market. Yet, for economic sociologists the neoclassical model becomes even more doubtful in its explanatory value when applied outside of exchange arenas that

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closely mirror its assumptions such as the trading floors studied by Abo-lafia (1996).

In the following, we more explicitly draw attention to systems of exchange that deviate from the market ideal explored above, yet still fall within a broader economic sociological agenda (see statements by Fligstein and Zelizer in Guillen et. al. 2002). Over human history, labor has taken place in three broadly defined settings, only some of them truly 'marketized:' large units such as armies and plantations and, more recently, corporations; local communities such as farms, workshops, and cottage industries; and in the household or domestic sphere (see Tilly and Tilly 1994). These contexts when explored by economic sociologists reveal that association, communal ties, and morality also play roles in organizing exchange now and in the past.

### *The Associative System and Alliance Capital*

Economic sociologists who study *networks* and *associations* have developed an understanding of exchange that assumes the opposite of classical economic theory. Transactions are viewed as predicated on the relations or 'ties' that exist between coexchangers and predicted by the strength and/or weakness of the bonds between them. Associative systems (Table 9.2, column 2) appear as networked systems of relations, characterized by strong ties of affiliation in which exchange and hence work are arranged through embedded ties (Uzzi 1996; Uzzi 1997; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Uzzi 1999). Sociologists developing structural arguments view social networks as the basis for all social contexts and groupings. The emergence of network explanations of market contexts is a very important theoretical alternative to economic accounts of exchange behavior. Exchange reflects particularism, in that participants in associative systems are given preference over nonmembers, but participation is also evocative of instrumentalism, as the pursuit of an end is organized around strategies that have proven effective. As arranged through associative systems of exchange, work is not entirely contingent on price, immediate or direct remuneration, but on the structure of ties between actors. The logic of action in such networks is independent of any given specific actor's will, belief, and/or values, but rather reflects the overall structure of ties (Wellman 1983). In this, network theory has made a strong case for the importance of networks to all human social contexts not just in the exchange of goods and services.

As it relates to laboring, work guilds, cottage industries, unions, alliances, and labor confederations, all exemplify the power that social

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relations hold for the shape that work takes. Networks appear as nested, overlapping, and interpenetrating associations of both strong and weak ties (Granovetter 1973). They exist at the level of the individual, such as kin networks as well as through less communal forms, for instance professional associations, occupational communities, and communities of practice (Van Maanen and Barley 1984; Wenger 1998; Wenger and Snyder 2000; Mather et al. 2001). Work in associative systems is a mutually defined activity in which one seeks to benefit personally; yet personal benefit is ultimately contingent on the association's success. Associations and alliances between economic actors involve voluntary arrangements that entail work relations based on cooperation, skill sharing, and both material and social coinvestment. Association-based networks appear as alliances and improve the chance of success and reduce the risks to individual member-workers of 'going it alone,' even if they simultaneously decrease the potential for particularized distinction and unrestrained success (i.e. individually experienced optimal outcomes). That is, actors in associative systems assume that, over the long run, mutual support and reciprocity—not autonomous self-interest—will result in the best outcome for the parties involved.

Training in associative systems, for example in professional associations and partnerships such as law firms (Mather et al. 2001; Vogel 2001) and medical practice (Hoff and MacCaffrey 1996), are typically organized via mentor–apprentice arrangements that gradually and selectively induct new members into the network and up the social hierarchy. Membership and standing hinge on both exhibiting significant ties and sufficient skill to represent the collective and train potential future members. Remuneration reflects the status and competence of the craftsperson and the object of their efforts, not necessarily hours spent as in (formal) market-based wage system. Exit in an associative system of work entails losing all forms of preferential treatment that come with embeddedness in the community of practice (Wenger 1998; Wenger and Snyder 2000).

### *The Communal System and Obligated Work*

Another variant of associational forms of work and exchange are those based on the logic of collectivity and mutual obligation. Communal systems of work (Table 9.2, column 3) are arranged between parties characterized by particularistic relations, for example those of kinship, ethnic ties, or common membership in a social order, when the substantive value of that relationship either supercedes or heavily influences other



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considerations (i.e. instrumentalism) and thus structures exchange and work relations. The substantive basis of the relationship—filial piety, consanguinity, and collegiality—sets the terms for exchange, including whether or not the exchange takes place, the prices that are asked and paid, and in fact whether or not direct and/or immediate payment is required at all. In brief, *communal systems* are organized by mutual and obligatory relations. It is the strength of reciprocal and binding relations that comprise and characterize communal systems and their overridingly substantive basis that differentiates them from the instrumental orientation of association-based systems of exchange that are also based on particularistic criteria.

In communal contexts work reflects membership in a collective where actors share a common identity or have some basis for a shared bond including family, tribe, ethnic group, village, or some other corporate form that if not involving consanguinity requires some alternative basis of emotional or social relation, what Ouchi (1980) and Boisot and Child (1988) refer to as embodying the *clan*. This is the defining aspect of participation: either one is, or is not, a member. The shared tie also identifies whether or not one is obliged preferential treatment (Weber 1978; Schluchter 1981). What is more, because in communal systems remuneration is based, at least in part, on reciprocity and redistribution (Polanyi 1957*b*) and couched in mutual obligation it is not entirely about price or personal advancement as in markets (i.e. price) or association based systems (i.e. personal advancement).

The basis of work in communal systems is typically dictated by customary rules governing participation and distribution of goods and services. These rules are rooted in substantive rationality and are the source of direction and order in relation between the parties. For example, the group, not an abstract principle, determines what is communally viewed as equitable between clan members given communal ties and member position (senior versus junior members) as well as how loyalty takes shape between segments of the clan—core family, extended family, village, local tribe, regional tribe, tribal diasporas, ethnic identification, and so forth. Nested inside these distinctions, communal relations and hence work can be particularistically arranged by sex difference (patriarchy), lineage (proximity to leadership), or caste (functional differentiation) with laboring reflecting obligation to the larger group. Finally, the communal context precludes true 'exit,' if one is a member by blood. Alternatively, exit may be complete if one is exiled by the group. In short, communal systems create tight rules for membership; one is either inside or outside the familial network.

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Case studies have shown work in *communal* or *family networks* reflect the configuration and rules that govern the relational structure. The Sicilian Mafia, Chinese Triads, and Russian Mafiyas fiercely regulate the terms and conditions of work and exchange in part by distinguishing between insiders and outsiders. In the Sicilian Mafia, those outside blood relations can buy services, but are not allowed into the inner recesses of the cabal, where planning and leadership are located (Gambetta 1993; Hess 1998). For example, Gambetta (1993) in his analysis of the Sicilian Mafia found it to be a kin-based economic organization whose chief 'work' was protection. That is, the mafia's chief 'product' is guarantor of economic transactions in a region historically plagued by an absent and ineffective state that does not guarantee contractual relations. What is more, Gambetta found that in contrast to outsider stereotypes of the mafia as violent, unfair, and locally maligned, Sicilians actively seek out its 'services' as a means of assuring smooth transactions in an otherwise unacceptably uncertain environment. This is especially interesting given that the mafia is both *particularistic* (i.e. partial, even unfair) and is *substantively* arranged around kin ties and codes of conduct such as family honor.

In patriarchal social systems, a form of communal structure, female labor is a largely unremunerated and often underappreciated source of material and emotional support in the domestic sphere and revenue in public-commercial sector (Kessler-Harris and Levenson 1982; Matthaei 1982). Feminist scholars have exposed and critiqued both the communal and cultural rationale for the exploitation of female labor, locating it in the character of patriarchal institutions as observed in gender roles and expectations that organize the current and highly sex segregated division of labor (Reskin 1993). For example, research outlining women's commitment to unpaid labor at home (Devault 1991) and their largely unrecognized efforts in volunteer organizations (Daniels 1987) illustrates how exchange and work can be organized according to communal principles—women's roles as 'women-workers' in a patriarchal society.

### *The Moral System and Honorable Work*

Finally, sociologists have also identified systems of exchange and work that are arranged via a shared and mutually defined higher purpose. Morally based exchange and work (Table 9.2, column 4) is organized by shared substantive beliefs or higher order principles. Even repugnant values, such as belief in ethnic superiority, can shape exchange relations and hence how work takes form, for example in slave and apartheid-based

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social systems (Owens 1977; Lazar 1996; Jeeves and Crush 1998). Actors are rational, but only insofar as their actions are oriented toward putting in place a universalistic value or their substantively rational actions are bound by a moral code.<sup>7</sup>

Work within moral systems is organized vis-à-vis a nonmaterial set of rewards—a higher purpose. Of all the systems of exchange and work described thus far, moral systems are most obviously rooted in a substantive logic, relying on initiation rights and socialization as the basis of integration into the social order with honor and recognition supplying a primary mode of remuneration, and shame and dishonor a means of sanction. Differentiation within moral economies is ethically founded and based on universalistic application. Outside of exile or expulsion from the group, or in the individual's repudiation of the moral system's guiding principles, exit is not easy to achieve.

Research that illustrates the moral aspects of work and exchange has taken a number of forms. Institutionalists have identified the shape and valorization of work as a reflection of religious piety (Weber 1976; Collins 1986; Sibley 1993), women's work as an expression of love and personality (Devault 1991) and moral commitment to the concept of family and community (Klatch 1987; Ahlander and Bahr 1995; Stone 1997; Gerson 2002), and in research on communes and communitarian devotion to work as expressing higher principles such as fraternity and equality (Vallier 1962; Barkin and Bennett 1972; Bennett 1975; Simons and Ingram 1997). Weber (1976) wrote the tour de force on the matters of morality, exchange, and work. It is in protestant asceticism and soteriological anxiety that Weber posits the origin of the intense need for material signs of salvation, the incredible motivation and valorization of work as the means of acquiring such material manifestations, and the subsequent rise of capitalism (Collins 1980). Whether of the physical or liturgical kind, laboring holds a central place in Judeo-Christian constructions of moral rectitude and personal discipline (Sibley 1993).

In the case of women's work roles and moral attributions, research by Klatch (1987) on *Women of the Right*—women who embrace traditional values, work roles, and subservience to men—found that in 'acting out her role as woman, as mother, as protector of her children, as moral gatekeeper, the social conservative woman finds affinity between the traditional female role and the adoption of an ideology that rejects narcissism and self-interest for "higher" values of self-sacrifice, faith, devotion and compliance with authority' (Klatch 1987). In this regard, socially conservative women see their gender roles—their submission to

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the 'natural authority' of patriarchal leadership (in the household, in the community, in the nation, and in god)—as derivative of divine inspiration and thus representative of a divinely ordained hierarchy. Seen through this moral frame, they exchange their labor for a higher order purpose or 'calling' (Klatch 1987).

Conversely, the transformation of gender roles in contemporary society, according to Gerson (2002), has undermined the division of labor and its perceived 'moral legitimacy'. Changes to how exchange structures operate in both familial and economic contexts has produced moral dilemmas for both women and men. This reflects women seeking personal achievement, which is contrary to traditional moral expectations that they seek personal development and relation to others by caring for them. Likewise, men, who in industrial society have traditionally been expected to achieve economically, be nonemotional (i.e. strong) providers and do so by exchanging their labor for wages in the public sphere are increasingly expected to be emotive, investing feeling and care in their relationships with their partners, their children, and even those they work with (Gerson 2002).

Work in communes and communitarian movements (Vallier 1962; Bar-kin and Bennett 1972; Bennett 1975), monasticism (Sibler 1993), and religious orders (Francis 1950) also provides a view of work pursued for reasons beyond the mundane, entirely instrumental, self-centered, or 'of this world'. That is, life and labor in such contexts involves adhering to an explicitly collectivist and often utopian ideal, guided by a set of moralist principles or canon that seeks simultaneously to embody a higher purpose and promote *gemeinschaft* among participants (Francis 1950; Weber 1976). In the case of the communes, for instance, those based on Jewish and Christian ideals, pietism is embodied in sharing possessions, sharing tasks and decisions with others, minimizing wants, and loving one's brethren.

## 4. Conclusion: Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Work

Economic sociological research has outlined the dynamically changing nature of macroscopic market conditions, viewable in both the internationalization of markets and in globalizing trends and consequently playing a role in the structure of work. These trends in turn have sensitized scholars of work to the changing conditions of new flexible and lean production regimes, increased firm emphasis on 'time to market,' reduction in the number of job classifications, increases in job rotation and

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multitasking, and increases in workplace teams and joint tasking in the modern workplace, to name but a few, are having on contemporary workplaces in the USA and around the world (Smith 1997; Barley and Kunda 2001). Changes in economic conditions have brought with them new forms and configurations of firms (Powell 1990) that have led to new work arrangements, which in turn require rapidly changing skill requirements for many jobs (Barley and Kunda 2001).

And yet, even given the contemporary emphasis on the transformation and spread of market-based systems of exchange, it has also become apparent from the collective research of critical, network, ecological, and institutional sociologists of both economic and quasi-economic contexts that markets are neither the only recognizable form of exchange to arrange work, nor are they themselves free from the influence of other less 'instrumentally rational' and 'universalistic' action logics. As Lie (1992: 58) states, regarding modes of exchange, 'Why should transactions between multinationals be equated with deals in weekend flea markets?'. In this regard, economic sociology has repeatedly illustrated that capitalism is neither singular nor converging on a monolithic form. Rather, capitalism is best conceived as a flexible system of relations whose parameters can accommodate divergent social, cultural, and network elements and still remain 'capitalist'. Nepotism, preferential pricing, patriarchy, morality, networks of association, and the like are viewable and understandable within capitalist and ostensibly market-based systems and outside them as well.

When we *assume* market relations as they are typically characterized, we overlook the ways in which work and economic regimes inform one another, can fundamentally differ in how exchange is conceptualized, and hence in how they are organized by participants. We contend that the relational dynamic between systems of exchange and work create the foundation for how economies themselves are created, conducted, and sustained. We have identified four ideal typical exchange logics that emerge from economic sociology and overlapping research and theory that reflect different assumptions concerning how exchange and work ought to be arranged, conducted, remunerated, and understood. Likewise, systems of work, once articulated, evolve and feed back onto exchange relations and in turn transform them.

By addressing the fundamental building blocks around which economies are built—the logics of exchange—we isolate groups of factors that collectively express different economic ideals and arrangements and as a result, different forms of work organization. This tack could complement

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current theories of economy and work by unifying their assertions and emphasizing their interpenetrating character. In short, dialogue between economic sociologists and scholars of work will encourage elaboration of formerly unchallenged assumptions by suggesting connections and divergences that would otherwise remain unexamined and hence unexplained.

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## Author Queries

- [AQ1] Footnotes 1–7 have not been provided.
- [AQ2] Abolafia and Biggart 1991 is not listed.